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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ERWIN U. MOSER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
ZION'S COOPERATIVE MERCANTILE 
INSTITUTION, a corporation, 
and JOHN A. ROGERS, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7148 
On October 10, 1945, the date of the accident in-
volved in this case, appellant Rogers left Salt Lake CitY 
at approximately 7 :00 o'clock A. M., driving appellant 
Z. C. 1\1:. I.'s truck, loaded with between six and seven 
tons of groceries (Tr. 339). Mr. Rogers had tire trouble 
en route to Logan, and was required to change the tire 
himself (Tr. 314). He drove from Salt Lake City .to 
Logan, where he delivered part of his load; and made 
other deliveries at Smithfield, Richmond, and Lewiston, 
in Utah, and at Fairview, Preston, and Franklin, in 
Idaho (Tr. 319). The accident occured at approximately 
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7:30 o'clock P. ~L, so at the time of its occurrance Mr. 
Rogers had been working for approximately 12 1-2 hours 
(Tr. 155. 340). 
At a point on U. S. Highway 91 approximately 66 
feet southwesterly of the Blacksmith Fork River bridge 
located llh miles southwest of Logan, Utah, appellants' 
truck, being driven in a southwesterly direction on said 
highway, collided with the automobile of respondent, 
which he was there driving in a northeasterly direction 
toward Logan. Appellant Rogers was riding alone in 
the truck. Respondent was driving his automobile, and 
sitting on his right in the front seat was his wife, with 
his wife's aunt, Mrs. Coral .Jones, sitting in the rear 
seat (Tr. 155). 
Exhibit H discloses that the paved portion of the 
highway at the point of the collision is 22 feet wide, 
and that the shoulders on either side of the paved por-
tion are 8 feet in width. That exhibit further discloses 
that the distance between the rails of the bridge is 25 
feet. 
Appellant Hogers testified that he first saw the 
!loser car as he entered the bridge, and that at that 
time it was about 300 feet distant (Tr~ 332, 333). Re-
spondent Moser testified that his particular attention 
was first called to appellant's truck by a sudden jerking 
of its lights as it entered the bridge (Tr. 157). Appellant 
Rogers testified he did not collide with the northwest 
corner of the bridge as he entered it, but this testimony 
is rebutted by that of appellants' witness Reese, who 
testified the north end of the bridge had been hit (Tr. 
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365), hy witne~s Haws ('rr. 289). by witness McMurdie 
(Tr. 272), and by witness Hiclanan (Tr. 229). Lt. Day, 
a witness for appellants, testified there was debris scat-
tered along the bridge in about the center of the road 
(Tr. 313). :Mr. Heese also testified that he "found part 
of the bed of this truck strung along the bridge" (Tr. 
357). The truck driven by appellant Rogers admittedly 
struck the west rail of the bridge (Tr. 323, 344) and 
broke off the post embedded at its southern end (Tr. 
326). After the collisison the outside right rear dual 
tire of the truck was flat, and its connecting rod was 
broken (Tr. 290). 
Respondent and his wife both testified that at all 
times prior to the collision, and at the time of the col-
lision, respondent's auton1obile was on its right side of 
the road (Tr. 159, 212). Respondent and his wife further 
testified that as appellants' truck left the bridge, and 
immediately prior to the accident, it suddenly came 
over into respondent's lane, and that its rear end was 
whipped around in front of respondent's automobile, 
and that the collision occurred in respondent's lane of 
traffic (Tr. 158, 210). 
After the collision, respondent's automobile was 
standing on the highway. Lt. Day, the first person to 
arrive at the scene of the accident, testified that the left 
front wheel of respondent's automobile "was not over 
the center line of the highway more than one foot" (Tr. 
312, 313). Lt. Day further testified that the "right rear 
wheel was just about off, nearly off the road" (Tr. 316) 
and that it was ''within about one foot of the edge of the 
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cement or pavement" (Tr. 317). The edge of the pave-
rnent referred to was on the right side of respondent's 
lane (Tr. 304). Tire marks on the top of respondent's 
automobile clearly appear from Exhibits A and B. Re-
spondent identified these tire marks on the top of his 
autmnobile (Tr. 192). Exhibits A, B and C disclose that 
respondent's car was pulled to the left of the direction 
in which it was traveling. 
ARGUI\iENT 
Wheel Marks of Truck on Right Shoulder of Highway 
Appellants in their brief, on page 26, state that 
certain physical facts are uncontroverted. This is not 
correct, and the following evidence disproves such state-
ment. Mr. Reese testified he saw a tire mark of the truck 
which ''led from the edge of the bridge to the right edge 
of the shoulder of the road" (Tr. 358). When asked on 
direct examination, "Which tire it was, of the truck' 
Did you determine that~" he answered, "Well, the front 
tire, which showed the best. I wouldn't say it was defin-
ite, it was a little dim.'' To the next question, ''On which 
side~'' he replied, ''That would be the right front tire 
-the right front tire." (Tr. 359). Mr. Gray. another of 
appellants witnesses, when asked what tire marks he 
saw on the shoulder, replied "The one I seen. it was 
a dual wheel track." (Tr. 393). Mr. Gray even testified 
that the track on the right was a little deeper than that 
on the left (Tr. 394) and this in spite of the fact that 
the right dual tire was flat. Witness :Mc~f urdie testifierl 
there were no tire marks on the shoulder southwest of 
the bridge (Tr. 404). 
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If there were tire Inarks on the shoulder southwest 
of the bridg-e, there is no way to tell what vehicle made 
the marks. They could have been made by the car of 
Lt. Day. He testified as follows: 
"Q. As you drove up to the scene of the accident, 
you then drove across the bridg-e and over onto the 
shoulder and parked your car, didn't you t '' 
"A. That's right." (Tr. 409). Lt. Day had been 
traveling in the same direction as appellants' truck. 
After parking his car on the right shoulder, he took 
his car onto the bridge and approached the Moser car 
from the south side of the bridge to throw his lights on 
the Moser automobile (Tr. 306). As Lt. Day backed 
onto the bridge, he could have made tire marks that 
resembled dual tires; or any tire mark that appeared 
on the shoulder could have been made by the numerous 
cars that passed. Lt. Day testified several cars passed 
the scene of the accident (Tr. 308). 
Appellants claim that the tire marks of the truck 
appear in unbroken continuity from the southwest cor-
ner of the bridge to the place where the truck came to 
rest in the barrow pit 117 feet southwest of the bridge 
(Tr. 324). If respondent's automobile had crossed the 
roaa and collided with the truck, the force of the impact 
would have made it impossible for the tire marks .of 
the truck to appear in unbroken continuity. In fact, if 
such had been the case, the truck would have been push-
ed off the shoulder at the point of impact. 
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Location of Debris 
Appellants contend that the location of the debris 
was where the accident occurred. This is particularly 
interesting in view of the testirnony of 1\Ir. Reese that 
there 1vasn 't anything to show definitely where the 
accident happened.· (Tr. 354). Where was the debris? 
:Mr. Reese testified that the majority of it was to the 
right of the center line of the highway, going north (Tr. 
354). He and Gray testified it was swept up by them 
. and deposited on the east shoulder. On the other hand, 
l\ir. l\fcMurdie testified that it was on the east side of 
the highway (Tr. 274, 275), that it was scattered and 
that it consisted of oil and battery plates (Tr. 282). Mr. 
Haws likewise testified that there was a dark spot or 
oil. pieces of battery plates, and scraps of different 
parts of the car on the. east side of the highway (Tr. 
289 290) and located the oil or blood spots on the pave-
rnent near its east edge (Tr. 292). Mr. Blaine Moser also 
testified as to battery plates and blood stains being on 
the east side of the highway between two and four feet 
from the east edge of the pavement (Tr. 195). 
Regardless of what lVIr. Reese stated in regard to 
cleaning up the debris, we know one cannot sweep away 
oil or blood spots on a cement highway. Furthermore, 
battery plates are thin, heavy and difficult to sweep 
away. Mr. Reese stated that he swept away the majority 
of it (Tr. 372). He did not testify he swept it all away. 
vVhen l\fr. Reese was questioned concerning the location 
of blood spots, he testified he ''wasn't interested in 
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blood ~pots, whether they wt:>re here or there." (Tr. 
371). 
Position of Respondent's Automobile 
Appellants state on page 26 of their brief that the 
position of respondent's automobile after the accident 
shows the collision did not occur on respondent's side 
of the highway. Lt. Day seemed more positive as to the 
position of respondents car after the accident than 
anyone else. Lt. Day testified that the car was 1n a 
diagonal position, that its left front wheel "was not 
over the center line of the highway more than one foot" 
(Tr. 312, 313). He further testified that the "right rear 
wheel was just about off, nearly off the road" (Tr. 316), 
and that it was ''within about one foot of the edge of the 
cement or pavement" (Tr. 317) on the east side of the 
highway (Tr. 304). Once again we call attention to the 
fact that Mr. Reese testified that there wasn't anything 
to show definitely where the accident happened (Tr. 
354). 
Tire marks on the top of respondent's car clearly 
appear fron1 Exhibits A and B. Mr. Moser identified 
these tire marks on the top of his car (Tr. 192). Exhibit~ 
A, B and C disclose that the top of the Moser car was 
pulled to the left of the direction in which it was travel-
ing. Exhibits Band C further disclose that the right side 
of the body of the Moser car, including its cowl, was 
pulled to the left. These are physical facts which prove 
that the left front end of the Moser car was pulled over 
to the left by appellantsl' truck. 
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Contrary to the claim of appellants, we submit that 
the location of respondent's car after the collision is 
conclusive evidence that in1mediately prior to the col-
lision it was on its right side of the highway. Practically 
the whole of that car was on the right side of the high-
way, and its having been pulled to the left is obvious. 
Blaine Moser (Tr. 197, 198), Hickman (Tr. 231), 
~fcMurdie (Tr. 278), and Haws (Tr. 290) all testified 
that they saw tire marks leading from about the center 
of the highway near the location of the debris thereon, 
directly to where the truck went off the road. Appellants 
clai.-rn that these witnesses were looking at tire marks 
made by equipment in pulling the appellants' truck up-
right. There is no evidence to this effect. Appellants 
next contend that because the truck finally landed 
parallel to the highway it could not have gone off the 
road at the angle the tire marks indicated, as testified 
by these witnesses. A truck going about forty miles an 
hour, out of control after a terrific collision, might 
possibly come to rest in any position. 
The sum and substance of appellants' argument 
as to liability seems to be that while there is a conflict 
in the evidence as to the negligence of appellants, none 
of respondent's evidence should be considerd bcause 
respondent shouldn't be believed and his witnesses' 
testin1ony should be dislregarded because they were 
Pither friends or relatives. Appellants tried this same 
argument without success on the trial court and jury. 
The evidence in this case discloses that the right 
rear wheel of appellants' truck collided with the north 
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end of the bridge. Appellant Rogers clailns it didn't, 
but the appellants' witness Reese said the north end 
of the bridge had been hit (Tr. 364). Witness Haws 
likewise testified (Tr. 289). l\Ir. l\1c~Iurdie testified to 
the sante faet err. 272) and so did l\1r. Hickman err. 
230). It is interesting to note that although appellant 
Rogers testified his truck did not hit the north end of the 
bridge, he made an investigation at that point (Tr. 327). 
The record does not disclose why he made this investi-
gation, or what he was looking for. We believe Mr. 
Ro~gers actually did not know his truck hit the north 
end of the bridge because we believe at that time he was 
asleep. No one will ever know just why appellant's 
truck hit the north end of the bridge, but we believe it 
was because he was tired from his long day's work, 
and dozed. At that point there was no need for him to 
anticipate danger, and there is evidence that he did not 
do so (Tr. 332). The bridge is 74 feet long, and the im-
pact occurred 66 feet beyond the end of the bridge in 
the direction Rogers was traveling (Tr. 196); both ve-
hicles were traveling at approximately the same rate 
of speed (Tr. 323) so at that particular moment the car 
and truck were at least 280 feet apart. Appellant Rogers 
admits he hit the rail of the bridge. The evidence is 
without dispute that he also hit the post at the south 
end of the bridge, and there is the point where he pulled 
the truck sharply to the left, in order to get away from 
the bridge, a natural, human reaction, and where he 
pulled his truck suddenlly into the, left lane of the high-
way and directly into the path of the 0 ;.(~omhtg. auto-
mobile of respondent. 
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Had appellant Rogers stayed on the right hand side 
of the road, the accident could never have happened. 
Appellants claim the right tire marks of the truck show-
ed clearly on the shoulder and there was no waive ring; 
that they ran directly to where the truck went off the 
highway. If that story is true, the Moser car would 
have had to cross the entire highway and run into the 
truck. The picture of respondent's automobile show the 
great force of the collision (Exhibits A, B and C). Had 
such a force collided with the truck, would its tire marks 
appear in a straight line~ Of course they ·wouldn't! 
There would have appeared on the shoulder a mark 
which would have disclosed a. scraping of the surface 
of the shoulder. 
And moreover, if the collision occurred 30 feet south 
of the bridge and on the west side of the highway, as 
appellant testified, (Tr. 324) it is difficult to perceive 
how the Moser car came to rest 66 feet south of the 
bridge, and diagonally in the east lane of traffic with 
the left front wheel about one foot over the center line, 
(Tr. 312, 313), and equally difficult to understand how 
Mrs. Moser, who was thrown onto the ground on the 
east side of the car at the time of the collision. was 
found lying partly on the east edge of the pavement 
and partly on the east shoulder, 66 feet' south of the 
bridge. (Tr. 211, 212, 213.) We submit that Roger's testi-
rnony, when examined in the light of the foregoing un-
controverted physical facts comes within the rule laid 
down by this ·court in Haarstrich vs. O.S.L., 70 Utah. 
552, 262 Pac. 100. 
I 
j 
I 
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\Y ~ submit the evidenct> in this case is clear that 
the collision occurred just as desci'ibed by respondent 
and his wife, and that is that as respondent was driving 
in his right lane of traffic the truck of appellants sud-; 
denly swerved over in front of respondent's automobile, 
and its left rear wheels ran over respondent's car. 
Appellanlts assert that respondent testified he was 
rendered unco~cious. Respondent did not so testify. He 
testified he did not know what happened after the im-
pact (Tr. 159). Dr. Hansen testified that in his opinion 
respondent was not entirely unconscious; that he was 
confused, and gave his reasons for such opinion, includ-
ing the talk of respondent (Tr. 258, 259). Dr. Hansen 
further testified that if unconsciousness is not complete 
there is not necessarily a loss of memory of the events 
preceeding the accident causing an injury (Tr. 260, 261). 
Appellants then contend that because the memory of 
respondent has been affected by this accident, he could 
not remember the facts of the accident, and, therefore, 
his testimony should be disregarded. Regardless of how 
poor the ability of a man may be to remember faces or 
names, certainly, so long as he has reasoning ability, he 
would remember being hit by a truck. 
Appellants assert that Mrs. ::Moser didn't know 
what happened, claiming she was "at least partially 
unconcious" and was hysterical (App. Brief 32). The 
testimony .of Mrs. Moser omitted in the quotation on 
page 32 of appellants' brief is: "My aunt called my 
husband. I could see him motioning. My aunt got on her 
feet and said 'Faye, where are you~' She was groping. 
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She was asking me where I was. She came towards us, 
and things were a little vague because I had a terrific 
blow.'' Immediately following that testimony of Mrs. 
!\loser is the following: 
Q. Was that the last thing you remember~ 
A. No, my aunt spoke to Erwin. She came running 
toward him. I said, 'How is Erwin'~ She said, 'Can I 
help you up~' I naturally wanted to see what was 
going to take place, and I tried to get up, and fell back 
do\\"'TI because of the impact, which made me very sick. 
She said, ''Vhat is the idea, what is the idea~' I said. 
'Go and get the number of the truck.' She went around 
the side, and ~aid, 'Don't worry, that truck won't get 
away--that will never get away'. And about that time--
soon afterwards there was people gathered, and a man 
came to where I was, and it seemed as if he was an 
inspector. However, lots of people were coming toward 
me, and he said he was a doctor. I said, 'What kind of 
a doctor~' And he said he was an M.D. doctor, and he 
made some inspection. 
"My aunt came. It was--it was rather cold, and I 
had my coat on, but I was lying in some water, in some 
rain pool, possibly, where I was lying, and she took off 
her coat and put it over me. She thought I would be 
cold. Then sometime after someone there was going to 
telephone, and they put us on a stretcher and took us 
to the hospital. 
0. Now, did you make any inspection of the scene 
of the night? 
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A. 1 was lying there, and I could see on all sides of 
me. I was lying on the road. 
Q. Approxinmtely where on the road were you 
lying~ 
A. l was l)ing over near the east side of the road. 
Q. Can you tell us approximately, in feet or 1n 
inches, how far frmn the east side of the road~ 
A. 'Veil, my head. stuck off the pavement on the 
east side of the road. ~fy head was off the pavement. 
(Tr. 211, 212) 
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE 
One of the strangest arguments we have ever heard 
is that respondent concealed the fact of a previous injury. 
This shows how desperate appellants are. What do they 
mean by ''conceahnent''~ We suppose they mean that 
although respondent was left permanently and severely 
injured by this accident, in fact a shell of a man, he 
should voluntarily have said to the jury "I think you 
shouldn't allow as much damages as you otherwise 
would, because five years ago I sprained my ankle and 
knee, which were completely cured before this accident.'' 
Respondent's deposition was taken by appellants, and 
he was cross examined by them. At no time did appel-
lants ask him about any prior accidents or injuries. If 
a plaintiff were required to divulge such information, 
a defendant would never ask about prior injuries pur-
posely in order to obtain a new trial. It is reasonable 
to assume that respondent never once thought of his 
skiing accident because the average person would not 
do so. 
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Coum;el for appellant state they first learned of the 
alleged newly .liscovered evidence on September 20, 1946, 
the day after the conclusion of the trial, and of the 
balance of it on about September 30, 1946. There is no 
showing \vhatsoever of any diJiigence on the part of the 
appellants to discover this evidence prior to the trial. 
Vve submit that the counter-affidavits filed in op-
position to the motion for a new trial was a complete 
answer to the affidavits in support of that motion, and 
that under no conceivable circumstance would the newly 
discovered evidence have been likely to change the 
result of the trial. The counter-affidavits disclose that 
respondent had completely recovered from the injuries 
suffered in his skiing accident on December 26, 1941. 
In fact, the affidavit of Albert R. Bowen discloses that 
the file of North American Insurance Company, which 
was examined by him, recites that recovery from the 
injuries received from the skiing accident"would not 
be complete for an additional thirty days from April 
22, 1942". The affidavits of W. E. McMurdis, of Dr. 
Hanson, of 1Iaurice M. ~Iarler, of Mrs. Moser, and of 
respondent himself, all are to the effect that there was 
no permanent injury sustained by respondent from 
said skiing accident. And Dr. Hanson states in his 
affidavit that there is no relationship between the injury 
to the knee and ankle suffered on December 26, 1941. 
and the injury to the left leg suffered on October 10, 
1945. The fact that the Insurance Company endorsed 
on its policy an exclusion of liability for future injuries 
which respondent might sustain to his left knee and 
ankle, upon the ground that said knee and ankle were 
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permanently hupaired, is absolutely iininaterial. It is 
cominon knowledge that insurance cmnpanies always 
do that; and it i~ surprising that the cmnpany did not 
Cc~nrcl his policy, as Inost accident insurance cmnpanies 
are wont to do after payn1ent of one loss. 
The statement of C. A. Thomas, an insurance man, 
that respondent dmnonstrated his ability to flex and 
use his knee and ankle, could not be believed by the 
Court, because the Court saw the condition of the knee 
and ankle at the time of trial, and could see as anyon~ 
would that even at that time it would be impossible for 
respondent to use and flex his ankle and knee in an 
~rdinary manner. 
The affadavits filed on behalf of respondent show 
that prior to the happening of the accident involved in 
this case, respondent had no· apparent disability of any 
kind, and that he worked and played as a normal in-
dividual. In view of this evidence, certainly the fact 
that five years prior to the happening of this accident. 
respondent had sprained his anlde and knee and would 
have been most unlikely to have changed the result of 
the trial, and particularly in view of the extremely 
severe injuries suffered by hiln in addition to the in-
juries to his knee and ankle. 
Appella;nts also claim that about three weeks be-
fore the ~~~:.~nt, respondent was injured in a bus acci-
dent. The affidavit filed by respondent himself is a 
complete answer to this. Respondent set forth in his 
affidavit that he was in no way incapacitated by that 
accident, and that he accepted from the Union Pacific 
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Uailroad Company, the o\vner of the bus, the sum of 
$150.00 in full settlement of any claim that he might 
make. As pointed out in the affidavit of respondent, the 
$150.00 was paid to him to buy a new suit of clothes and 
to pay hin1 for the inconvenience he had sustained by 
reason of said accident. A fellow passenger on the bu::; 
had bled on respondent's suit, which was the only dam-
age he had sustained in that accident. We submit that 
the fact that respondent was in the bus accident cer-
tainly would not have been likely to have changed the 
results of the trial in this case. 
On page 21 of appellants' brief, in discussing the 
question of newly discovered evidence, counsel have the 
following to say: 
''In general it may be said that four ele-
Jnents, if found to exist, are sufficient to support 
a new trial based upon a showing of such evi-
dence. Those elements are: (1) diligence in se-
curing the evidence before trial; (2 and 3) that 
such evidence is more than cumulative and im-
peaching in its effect; and ( 4) that it is material 
and likely to change the result." 
The following Utah cases are cited by appellant as 
having accepted the foregoing principles: 
"Klopenstine vs. Haws, 20 Utah 45; Trimble 
vs. Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 Pac. 
2d 67 4; Jensen vs. Logan City, 89 Utah 34 7, 57 
Pac. 2d 708; Van Dyke vs. Ogden Savings Bank, 
48 Utah 606, 161 Pac. 50.'' 
From an examination of the decisions rendered in 
the foregoing cases, it will be seen that all of those 
cases are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. 
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In the rase of KJopenstine v~. Hays, supra, the trial 
court denied a nwtion for new trial, and upon appeal to 
this court the ruling of the trial court was sustained, 
on the ground as stated in the opinion: 
• 'rrhe facts presented in this affidavit, if 
true, would tend to iinpeach and contradict the 
testin1ony of the plaintiff. In some respects the 
testimony is cumulative, and no reason is shown 
why with reasonable diligence the witness Lamb 
could not have been produced at the trial." 
In the ca;:;e of Trimble vs. Union Pacific Stages, 
supra, the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action, 
and· the plaintiff made a motion for new trial, which 
was denied by the trial court. In holding that the lower 
court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion , this 
Court said: 
''Nor do we believe that the lower court 
erred in refusing to grant a new trial. The evi-
dence of witnesses Hess and Halahan was cumul-
ative, and it is well sP-ttled in this state that such 
evidenee is not ground for a new trial.'' 
In the case of Jensen vs. Logan City. supra, the 
jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant, no cause 
of action, and the trial court denied plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial. The plaintiff supported his motion for 
a new trial with two affidavits, and in holding that the 
evidence set forth in these affidavits, if true, was 
material and entitled him to a new trial, this Court 
said: 
"The two affidavits of H. W. Jeppson and 
Donna Lundberg reveal testimony which the 
plaintiff should have the benefit of. Miss Lund-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
bern· on the evenin cr of March 18th, the night of 
'b ;:, 
the accident, while walking on the paved portion, 
tripped on the wire and lost her balance. Jeppson 
on March 7th pushed up the wire which was 
projecting 18 inches on the pavement and laid it 
clear of the pavement and then notified Mr. 
N yrnan. * * * * If 1Iiss Lundberg testified as 
stated in her affidavit, it will throw a light on 
the case which heretofore did not play upon it. 
Jeppson's testimony would be quite positive of 
the ability of the loose fence end to extend onto 
the pavement. Where disinterested testimony on 
the vital point in a case is very scant, newly 
discovered testimony on that point to be appar-
ently reliable, when it appears that the movant 
for the new trial was not guilty of indiligence in 
failing to obtain the witness for the trial. and 
that there is no element of holding such witness 
in reserve for purposes of obtaining a new trial 
-generally picturesquely denominated in slang 
phraseology as 'an ace in the hole' -and it ap-
pears likely that such evidence would change the 
result, a new trial should be granted.'' 
And although this Court held in the Jensen case that 
the newly diseovered evidence was material and was not 
merely cumulative, yet it recognized the well settled 
rule which should govern the Courts when called upon 
to rule on a motion for a new trial : 
'' 'It is only under very special circum-
stances, because of the quality or type of pro-
posed evidence and where it makes clear a fact 
which was formerly in doubt that new trials are 
granted to allow the defeated party to add cum-
ulative evidence, newly discovered, and then only 
where there is a clear probability that the result 
of a ne·w trial will be different.' '' (Italics sup-
plied.) · 
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\Ve respe(~tfully sub1nit that in the case of Van 
Dyb_• v~. Ogden Savings Bank, supra, the question in-
vo1Yl'd on the 1notion for new trial was not so much 
newly discoYPrPd evidence as it was the refusal of the 
defendant to give plaintiff access to certain bank checks 
which were clain1ed to be forgeries, so that the plain-
tiff could photograph the checks and enlarge them to 
enable her handwriting experts to make a more thor-
ough study of the signatures upon the checks, to more 
definitely determine whether they were foi_'geries. 
It was conceded that the defendant and its counsel 
refused plaintiff's demand for access to said checks 
prior to the trial in the lower ?ourt, and that after the 
trial was concluded and the verdict went in favor of 
the defendant. the plaintiff caused a special action to be 
instituted to gain access to the checks. The enlarged 
photographs of the checks were attached to the affi-
davits in support of plaintiff's n1otion for new trial 
and rp.ad~ a part thereof. This Court held that the plain-
tiff should have had access to said checks prior to the 
trial in order to develop her case in support of her con-
tention that her former husband had forged her sig-
nature to said checks ; and being denied this right in 
the trial court, she had not been accorded a fair trial. 
On page 23 of appellant's brief, counsel made the 
following statement: 
"When a verdict is against the great weight 
of the evidence it is the trial court's right and 
duty to set the verdict aside and grant a new 
trial. If in such case he fails to do so, he has 
abused his discretion.'' 
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In support of the foregoing statement, counsel cites 
the Utah case of Valiotis vs. Utah-Apex ~1:ining Com-
pany, 55 Utah 1~1, 194 Pac. 802. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that the decision of this Court in the Valiotis 
case is an ahsolute authority for the ruling of the trial 
Court in denying defendant's motion for a new trial 
in the case at bar. In that case the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, supported by substan-
tial evidence. And the trial Court denied the defendant's 
motion for a new trial. which ruling was affinned by 
this Court. In reviewing the evidence in that case, this 
Court said: 
''While the evidence on the part of the de-
fendant, consisting of the testimony of seven 
witnesses. tended strongly to prove that the 
ladder in question was in sound condition at the 
time of the accident, • "" * it was not conclusive. 
Not only the testimony of the plaintiff, but 
the testimony of three other witnesses produced 
in his behalf, equally positive and more direct, 
tended to prove that plaintiff's fall and conse-
quent injury was caused by a loose rung which 
gave ·way as plaintiff stepped on it. Reasonably 
certain it is that if the rung gave way as plaintiff 
stepped upon it, and caused him to fall, as he 
testified. the rung was loose and insecure at that 
time.'' -
And this Court held that there was a substantial 
conflict of the evidence, and sustained the trial court's 
ruling in denying the motion for new trial, using the 
following language : 
"Therefore, so far as the soundness of the 
ladder, or the l~eness of the rung, and the re-
sulting injury to plaintiff, is concerned, there 
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was a substantial conflict of evidence which re-
quired the jury to weigh the conflicting evidence 
and the credibility of the witnesses who testified 
thereto and determine the question of fact thus 
presented. In view of the verdict of the jury and 
the trial court's ruling on motion for new trial, 
that question of fact must be resolved against 
the appellant and in favor of the trial court's 
ruling." 
On page 25 of [!,ppellant 's brief, the following con-
tention is made : 
''The evidence of plaintiff and his witness-
es. when examined in the light of the uncontro-
verted physical facts, could not be true. The two 
could not have co-existence. It is our contention 
that statements which fly in the face of estab-
lished physical fact must be disregarded as evi-
dence.'' 
The case of Haarstrich v. 0. S. L., 70 Utah 552, 262 
Pac. 100, is cited in support of the above rule. Although 
the rule was properly applied in that case, it will be 
seen that the rule contended for by appellant does not 
apply to plaintiff's evidence in the instant case, as will 
be noted from the following quotation from the Haar-
strich case : 
''The jury found. in answer to special inter-
rogatories that the speed of the automobile in 
approaching the crossing was between 25 and 
30 miles an hour while the speed of defendant's 
car was between 5 and 6 miles an hour. The driver 
of the automobile appeared to be an experienced 
driver, and testified that at a speed of 30 miles 
an hour he could have stopped his car within 
40 feet. At a speed of 25 miles an hour he could 
have stopped within a shorter distance. From the 
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premises above stated it appears that from the 
tin1e defendant's car entered upon the highway 
until it collided with the automobile, the front 
end of the car had reached a point 24 or 25 feet 
beyond, making in all at least 42 feet which the 
car had moved after entering upon the highway. 
The decisive question therefore is, At what point 
on the highway was the automobile when the 
defendant's car entered upon the paved highway! 
No matter whether the automobile was moving 
at 25 or 30 miles an hour or whether defendant's 
car was moving at 5 or 6 miles an hour, it is quite 
conclusive that the aut01nobile was moving five 
times as fast as was the car of defendant. So 
that if defendant's car moved 42 feet from the 
time it entered upon the highway until it was 
struck, the automobile must have been five times 
that distance north of the crossing when defend-
ant's car entered upon the highway, or 210 feet, 
which is five times the distance within which 
the driver of the automobile, according to his 
own testimony, could have stopped his automo-
bile and avoided the collision.'' 
Instructions 
Appellants claim the Court erred In refusing to 
give their requested Instruction No. 1, which reads as 
follows: 
''You are instructed that defendants are not 
required to explain how or why the collision in-
volved in this case occurred. The burden is upon 
the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of all 
of the evidence that the collision resulted from 
the negligence of defendant." (R. 33). 
That instruction was covered entirely by Instrue-
tions as given. Instruction No. 4 specifically covered 
the burden of proof, as follows : 
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··The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence, as that term 
i~ herinafter defined, the allegations of said 
emnplaint, a8 the srune are set forth in Instruc-
tion No. 2. '' 
Instruction No. 9, as given. covers the first sen-
ret{"esteP 
tence of tlw "f·equirQc;l instruction. Instruction 9 is as 
follows: 
• • Yon are instructed that the mere fact· that 
an accident happened, or that plaintiff was in-
jured, constitutes no proof of negligence against 
the defendants.,., 
Instruction No. 10 likewise covers requested In-
struction No. 1, which was refused .. That instruction, 
in part, is as follows : 
''In order for you to find· a verdict for the 
plaintiff, you must believe {rom a preponderance 
of the evidence; first, that the defendants were 
negligent in one or more of the particulars alleg-
ed by the plaintiff in his said complaint, as set 
forth in Instruction No. 2; • • • '' 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case discloses that the accident 
occurred because appellant Rogers lost control of the 
truck he was driving, struck the bridge. and in attempt-
ing to get his truck away from the bridge rail, suddenly 
pulled it to his left and then to his right, causing its rear 
end to be whipped around in front of respondent's on-
coming automobile, into respondent's lane of traffic, 
and in collision with respondent's car. 
Appellants state that ''there is a sharp and direct 
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conflict in the testimony as to which driver was at fault" 
(App. Brief, p. 2).and then attempt to discredit every 
witness of respondent. In this they have failed and the 
record discloses the reason why. 
rrhe appellants' motion for a new trial was proper-
ly denied by the trial Court. There ·was no showing of 
diligence on the part of appellants to discover the al-
leged newly discovered evidence and that evidence was 
not material and would not have changed the result of 
the trial. 
The trial Court instructed the jury as requested by 
appellants, and they had a fair trial. They now want 
to try this case over again, but they have failed to show 
any reason why they should be granted such a right. 
For the foregoing reasons respondent respectfully 
submits that the verdict in this case should be sustained 
and the judgment of the trial Court affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
L.E.NELSON 
SAMUEL J. CARTER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff --
and Respondent 
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